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Soder: A Constitutional Limbo

A CONSTITUTIONAL LIMBO: SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC
DEVICES AT THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER
Michael Soder

I. INTRODUCTION
Searches of travelers and their personal effects at the international
border are far from a new phenomenon.1 Individuals, whether they travel
internationally or not, are likely aware of the in-depth security process for
crossing the border.2 The Supreme Court has recognized that under the
“border search” exception, warrantless searches of persons and property
are reasonable, and therefore allowed, simply because they occur at the
border.3 As a result, customs officials have plenary authority to search a
traveler’s property when said traveler is entering or exiting the country.4
In the digital age, however, searches of cell phones, laptops, cameras, and
other electronic devices at the border have become an increasingly
contentious, and common, issue.5 Scholars6 and courts7 have increasingly
recognized the need to determine the proper constitutional treatment for
searches of electronic devices at the border.
United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) recently
reported that “[i]n this digital age, border searches of electronic devices
are essential to enforcing the law at the U.S. border and to protecting the
American people.”8 This stance is represented through both CBP’s and
1. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
2. See TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., Security Screening, https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening.
3. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
4. See infra Section II-C.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Kolsuz,
890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018); Examining Warrantless Smartphone Searches at the Border: Hearing on S.
2462 Before the S. Subcomm. on Fed. Spending Oversight and Emergency Mgmt., 115TH Cong. 1 (2018),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/fso/hearings/examining-warrantless-smartphone-searchesat-the-border.
6. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Electronic Search and Seizure at the Border, 128 YALE L.J.F.
(forthcoming); Thomas Miller, Note, Digital Border Searches After Riley v. California, 90 WASH. L. REV.
1943 (2015); Matthew B. Kugler, Comment, The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic Devices
at the Border: An Empirical Study, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165, 1211 (2014); Louisa K. Marion, Borderline
Privacy: Electronic Border Searches After Cotterman, 28-SUM CRIM. JUST. 36 (SUMMER 2013).
7. See, e.g., Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323 (D. Mass. May 9,
2018); Touset, 890 F.3d 1227; Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133; United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir.
2018); United States v. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1008 (S.D. Cal. 2016); United States v. Ramos, 190 F.
Supp. 3d 992 (S.D. Cal. 2016); United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc);
United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2014).
8. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CBP Releases Updated Border Search of Electronic Device
Directive
and
FY17
Statistics
(Jan.
5,
2018)
(quoting
John
Wagner),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-releases-updated-border-search-electronicdevice-directive-and.
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the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (“ICE”)
policy directives authorizing digital border searches.9 In 2016, CBP
conducted 19,051 border searches of electronic devices.10 In 2017, this
number increased to 30,200 searches.11 Likewise, in 2015, ICE reported
searching 4,444 cell phones and 320 other electronic devices; in 2016, the
number of digital device searches increased to 23,000.12 Such a sharp rise
in the number of searches conducted is cause for alarm.13 Given that these
searches reveal a wealth of information, ranging from emails, text
messages, and photographs, from 2011 to 2017 international travelers
filed approximately 250 complaints with the Department of Homeland
Security.14
The Supreme Court has yet to determine what the Fourth Amendment
requires regarding digital searches at the border, leaving lower federal
courts to handle this difficult task. However, lower courts are not
completely without guidance. In three Supreme Court cases—United
States v. Ramsey,15 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,16 and United
States v. Flores-Montano17—a distinction between “routine” and
“nonroutine” border searches emerged. Based on this distinction, some
lower courts began to require some level of suspicion for forensic
searches of electronic devices at the border, notwithstanding the
traditional border search exception.18
9. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., Border Search of Electronic Devices, CBP Directive No.
3340-049A (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2018-Jan/CBPDirective-3340-049A-Border-Search-of-Electronic-Media-Compliant.pdf; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION &
CUSTOMS ENF’T, Border Searches of Electronic Devices, ICE Directive No. 7-6.1 (August 18, 2009,
reviewed August 18, 2012).
10. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. Examining Warrantless Smartphone Searches at the Border: Hearing on S. 2462 Before the
S. Subcomm. on Fed. Spending Oversight and Emergency Mgmt., 115TH Cong. 1 (testimony of Laura K.
Donohue, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) (citing Daniel Victor, What Are Your
Rights if Border Agents Want to Search Your Phone?, N.Y. Times (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/business/border-enforcement-airport-phones.html).
13. CBP officials reported that these searches affected less than 1% of the approximate 300 million
travelers who arrived in the United States in 2017. Ron Nixon, Cellphone and Computer Searches at U.S.
Border
Rise
Under
Trump,
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Jan.
5,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/us/politics/trump-border-search-cellphone-computer.html.
Although this is a notably small percentage, this does not change the fact that thousands of travelers have
their private personal information revealed during these searches.
14. See Charlie Savage and Ron Nixon, Privacy Complaints Mount Over Phone Searches at U.S.
YORK
TIMES
(Dec.
22,
2017),
Border
Since
2011,
NEW
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/us/politics/us-border-privacy-phone-searches.html.
Travelers
whose electronic devices were searched described themselves as being “made to feel like a criminal” and
experiencing a “blatant abuse of privacy.” Id.
15. 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
16. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
17. 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
18. See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 569 (D. Md. 2014); see also United

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/6

2

Soder: A Constitutional Limbo

2019]

A CONSTITUTIONAL LIMBO

241

To complicate the matter, in 2014 the Supreme Court announced in
Riley v. California that generally, a cell phone cannot be seized incident
to a lawful arrest without a warrant supported by probable cause.19 After
2014, a small minority of lower courts recognized Riley’s reasoning as
supporting a constitutional requirement of reasonable suspicion to search
a traveler’s electronic device at the border.20 Most recently, in May 2018,
two Federal Circuit Courts reached opposing conclusions on the issue,
offering both new perspectives and preserving the challenge of how
“suspicionless” digital device searches should be treated. The Fourth
Circuit, in United States v. Kolsuz, relied in part on Riley to conclude that
the Fourth Amendment requires some form of “individualized suspicion”
to forensically search electronic devices at the border.21 In contrast, the
Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Touset, rejected an application of
Riley, and upheld “suspicionless” forensic searches of an electronic
device.22
In light of the recent decisions of Kolsuz and Touset, this Article will
explore the constitutionality of searches of electronic devices at the
international border, and suggest that the Fourth Amendment requires
reasonable suspicion to conduct such searches. Although the Article
mainly considers the constitutionality of forensic searches, the reasoning
applies equally as forcefully to manual searches. First, Section II explores
the relevant doctrinal foundation for the border search exception,
discussing general Fourth Amendment standards, the impact of
technology in defining the “reasonableness” of searches, and the border
search exception more generally. Section III narrows the focus to a
discussion of the intersection of technology and the border search
exception and differing approaches taken by federal circuit courts
regarding searches of electronic devices. Lastly, Section IV analyzes the
differing approaches to determine the appropriate Fourth Amendment
analysis of searches of electronic devices at the border. The following
States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
19. 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2018). Even before Riley, a few
lower courts began requiring reasonable suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices. See
Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968; see also Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 569. In 2017, the American Civil
Liberties Union filed a lawsuit on behalf of 10 plaintiffs against the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”), challenging the practice of warrantless digital device searches under the Fourth Amendment.
The federal district court denied the DHS’s motion to dismiss, finding that Riley is at least partially
applicable in the border search context. See Alasaad v. Nielsen, Co. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL
2170323, at *21 (D. Mass. May 9, 2018). Plaintiffs’ also alleged that the practice violated their First
Amendment rights by burdening their “protected rights of freedom of speech and association and
chill[ing] the exercise of these rights.” Id. at *22. Likewise, the court rejected DHS’s motion to dismiss
this claim. Id. at *24.
21. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144.
22. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234-35 (11th Cir. 2018).
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analysis suggests that the Fourth Circuit is correct and, furthermore, that
the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion for all searches of
electronic devices at the border.
II. BACKGROUND
The following section proceeds in three parts, providing an overview
of the jurisprudence underlying the split between the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits. Part A introduces the Fourth Amendment, explaining the
coverage and requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Part B then
explores how courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment in light of
technological advances, particularly electronic devices, such as cell
phones. Finally, Part C focuses on the border search exception to the
Fourth Amendment, and the determination of what constitutes a
reasonable search and seizure at the international border.
A. Fourth Amendment Standards
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.23

The basic aim of this Amendment “is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials.”24 From a historical standpoint, the Fourth Amendment
represents the Framers’ response to “the reviled ‘general warrants’ and
‘writs of assistance’” that existed under British rule, which allowed
“British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for
evidence of criminal activity.”25 The Supreme Court subsequently
imposed further limitations and restraints on the government’s search and
seizure power via adoption of the exclusionary rule.26 This rule, serving
as a deterrent function, generally prohibits the prosecution from
presenting evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights.27
23. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
24. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of
City and Cty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
25. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
26. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (“to obtain conviction by means of
unlawful seizures . . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts . . . .”).
27. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231-32 (2011); see also Elkins v. United States, 364
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Although judicial interpretation of both the meaning and coverage of
the Fourth Amendment has dramatically changed over the years,28 a
court’s approach to analyzing a search can be distilled down into two
inquiries.29 First, the Amendment is only applicable if the incident at
question is deemed a “search,”30 which turns on whether government
agents invade a person’s individual interest that is “constitutionally
protected” by the Amendment.31 To determine if an interest is
constitutionally protected—and thus whether there has been a search—
courts generally apply the mystical-sounding “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test to determine whether a particular search is intrusive enough
to implicate the Fourth Amendment.32 A reasonable expectation of
privacy exists if (1) an individual has an actual expectation of privacy in
an object or place and (2) society is prepared to recognize that expectation
as reasonable.33
The second requirement imposed by the Amendment is that the search
itself must be reasonable, as “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (the rule’s purpose is “to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty [of the
Fourth Amendment] . . . .”) The Court has also held that the exclusionary rule also applies to state courts,
via the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). However, as the exclusionary
rule is based on a deterrence effect, the Supreme Court has progressively narrowed the rule’s application
through several exceptions. See, e.g, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (good-faith
exception); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (independent source doctrine); Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (inevitable discovery doctrine); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963) (attenuation/dissipation of taint doctrine).
28. See WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS §1.1 (2D ED.
2018).
29. 68 AM. JUR. 2D SEARCHES AND SEIZURES §12 (2D 2018).
30. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE §2:1 (5TH ED. 2018) (“[c]entral to an
understanding of the Fourth Amendment . . . is a perception of what police activities, under what
circumstances and infringing upon what areas and interests, constitute . . . a search . . . within the meaning
of that Amendment.”).
31. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS §2:1; see Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (“the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general
constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”).
32. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (“Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of the
Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a
‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by the government action.”)
(internal citations omitted). Katz represented a shift from then existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
which relied exclusively on a property-rights, trespass interpretation of the Amendment. See Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. at 627 (1886) (“every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a
trespass.”) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765) (Eng.)). However, the
Court subsequently clarified that Katz did not abrogate the property-rights interpretation. See United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2011) (“the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been
added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”) (emphasis in original).
33. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Generally, the permissibility or
reasonableness of a particular search will turn on the balance between an individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against promoting legitimate governmental interests. See 68 AM. JUR. 2D SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES §12 (2D 2018).
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Amendment is reasonableness.”34 Generally, this requires officers or
government agents to obtain a judicial warrant from a “neutral and
detached magistrate,” as opposed to “being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”35 This
requirement of judicial oversight provides both an “orderly procedure”
and the impartiality needed to realize the guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment.36 A warrant must be based upon a finding of probable
cause—a “fluid concept” that turns on “particular factual context,” and is
thus a “practical, nontechnical conception.”37 Given this standard,
probable cause requires “specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.”38 Put another way, probable cause exists when “the facts
available to . . . [an officer] would warrant a person of reasonable caution
in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.”39 Although
courts have traditionally treated warrantless searches as per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, there are a few “specially
established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement.40
However, even if a particular search falls within an exception to the
warrant requirement, courts can still require some type of justification for
the search, such as probable cause41 or reasonable suspicion.42 Reasonable
suspicion requires more than “a mere hunch,” but the “level of suspicion
. . . is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of
the evidence and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.”43
34. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014) (internal citation omitted).
35. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“When the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
Government enforcement agent.”).
36. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (internal citation omitted); see also Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (“the possession of a warrant . . . greatly reduces the perception of
unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring ‘the individual whose property is searched or seized of
the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.’”)
(quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)
(“An arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of
probable cause[.]”).
37. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231-32; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
38. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
39. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
40. Katz v. Unites States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 153-56 (1925); Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Warden Md. Penitentiary v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967). Typical exceptions include searches of automobiles, Collins v.
Virginia, 138 S.Ct. 1663, 1669 (2018), and searches incident to arrest, Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
382-85 (2014).
41. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
42. See Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 36-37. A search only requiring reasonable suspicion, like one requiring
probable cause, is still based on the totality of the circumstances approach. See United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
43. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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In essence, an officer or governmental agent must have “a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.”44 This standard is satisfied when a government agent
can identify “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”45
B. The Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age46
Given the seemingly exponential technological advances within the
past half-century, courts have struggled to interpret the Fourth
Amendment in light of these developments.47 The intersection of
technological advances and the Fourth Amendment have created a
difficult setting for judicial determination of “reasonable” searches.48This
is particularly so given the Fourth Amendment’s historical tie to real
property concepts.49 Yet, as technology has indeed “propelled us into a
new era,”50 “the facts that the Fourth Amendment regulates . . . are
constantly evolving” due to the new tools afforded to officers and
government agents, as well as the advent of technological devices
available to the general population.51 More often than not, new
technologies have “destabilized the relationship” between privacy and
property.52
The struggle to apply the Fourth Amendment within this context
largely results from the application of Katz v. United States’s reasonable
expectation of privacy test.53 Although Katz did arguably expand the
44. Id. at 404 (internal citations omitted).
45. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
46. For an insightful and in-depth overview, see Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a
Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 553 (2017).
47. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (electronic listening and recording device
used to hear a conversation in a public phone booth); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (use of
thermal imager to detect infrared radiation emanating from a home); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400
(2011) (installation of Global-Positioning-System on Defendant’s vehicle); Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
373 (2014) (search of Defendant’s cellphone incident to arrest).
48. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 808 (2004) (“no one knows whether an expectation of
privacy in a new technology is ‘reasonable.’”).
49. Id. at. 809. Early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence established that the Framer’s considered
common law trespass as “sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and
seizures.” See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886).
50. Donohue, supra note 46 at 554.
51. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 485 (2011).
52. Kerr, supra note 48 at 827.
53. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60-61 (2001)
(“Fourth Amendment doctrine, moreover, is circular, for someone can have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in an area if and only if the Court has held that a search in that area would be unreasonable.”);
Kerr, supra note 48 at 808.
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coverage of the Fourth Amendment,54 there is no “talisman that
determines in all cases” which privacy expectations are reasonable; courts
must examine the particular search to determine if the search was
constitutionally permissible.55
Even with these difficulties, Fourth Amendment protections have been
established based on privacy concerns stemming from technological
advances.56 In Riley v. California, the Court considered whether police,
without a warrant, could search digital information on a cell phone that
was seized incident to an arrest.57 Prior precedent established a categorical
rule allowing the warrantless search of an individual incident to a lawful
arrest,58 but the Court rejected a mechanical interpretation of precedent.59
Instead, the Court assessed the balance of “the degree to which . . . [the
search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy” versus the need of the
search for promoting “legitimate governmental interests.”60 Regarding
the governmental interests, the Court noted that the justifications
underlying the search incident to arrest doctrine, destruction of evidence
and harm to officers, would not be served in applying the exception to
searches of cell phones.61 Although an arrestee does have a diminished
privacy interest, Chief Justice Roberts engaged in an in-depth analysis of
one’s privacy interest in a cell phone.62
The Court distinguished searches of cell phones from searches of
physical items, as cell phones “differ in both a quantitative and qualitative

54. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE §2.1(B).
55. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987). Some scholars have posited that determining
the scope of the Fourth Amendment inherently entails “value judgments” by the courts. See, e.g., Michael
R. Gardner, Rediscovering Trespass: Towards a Regulatory Approach to Defining Fourth Amendment
Scope in a World of Advancing Technology, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 1027, 1069 (2014).
56. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that Thermovision imaging
of a house is an unlawful search); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
57. Riley, 573 U.S. at 378. The case consolidated two separate appeals. In the first case police
seized the defendant’s “smart phone” and examined it both on the spot and later at the police station. Id.
at 379-80. In the second case, police seized defendant’s “flip phone,” accessed the recent call log, and
used that information to ascertain an address and subsequent search warrant. Id. at 380-81.
58. Id. at 382-84 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (allowing a search of
“the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted)); see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (rejecting a case-by-case adjudication
to determine the constitutionality of a search of a person incident to a lawful custodial arrest); see also
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (limiting the exception to “personal property
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.”).
59. Riley, 573 U.S. at 386.
60. Id. at 385 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
61. Riley, 573 U.S. at 386-89. An officer could simply seize the phone and thus eliminate either
risk.
62. Id. at 392 (when “privacy-related concerns are weighty enough” a “search may require a
warrant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations of privacy of the arrestee.”) (quoting Maryland v.
King, 569 U.S. 435, 463 (2013)).
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sense from other objects” that might be on an arrestee’s person.63 The
immense storage capacity of cell phones, the Court articulated, creates a
“substantial additional intrusion on privacy” as opposed to a simple
search of more traditional physical items.64 Moreover, modern cell phones
hold “the privacies of life,”65 and the conglomeration of types of
information stored in a cell phone allows for the sum of an individual’s
private life to be reconstructed through one search.66 Given the privacy
concerns implicated through search of a cell phone, the Court held that a
warrant is generally required to search a cell phone, even when the cell
phone is seized incident to arrest.67
C. The Border Search Exception68
The “border-search doctrine” is a “narrowly defined”69 and
“historically recognized” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement, establishing that searches conducted at the border without a
warrant or probable cause are nonetheless reasonable.70 The exception
stems from two, interrelated lines of reasoning that led the Supreme Court

63. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393 (analogizing a search of a cell phone to a search of physical items “is
like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.”).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 403 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
66. Riley, 573 U.S. at 394-97 (The Court also noted a cell phone’s “element of pervasiveness” as
nearly every individual carries one on their person at any given time).
67. Id. at 401. In 2018, the Supreme Court addressed in Carpenter v. United States how the Fourth
Amendment applies to “the ability to chronicle a person’s past movements through the record of his cell
phone signals.” 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018). The police had obtained the Defendant’s location through
the use of cell-site location information collected by wireless carriers via cellular signal tapping into local
cell sites. Id. at 2211-12. The majority declined to extend Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), and
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), to “cover these novel circumstances.” Id. at 2216-17. The
Court went on to hold that the government’s actions invaded the defendant’s “reasonable expectation of
privacy in the whole of his physical movements,” and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2219.
68. Since the exception applies to the border, it covers individuals and property that are both
entering and exiting the country. See, e.g., United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1296-97 (4th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir. 2001). Searches need not occur at the physical border
as the exception covers searches at the “functional equivalent of a border,” such as airports. See e.g.,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). Additionally, extended border searches,
which occur after the travelers “actually entry has been effected,” are encompassed within the exception.
See, e.g., United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 883 (9th Cir. 2009) (requiring reasonable
suspicion for extended border searches as these searches “intrude more on an individual’s normal
expectations of privacy[.]”).
69. See United States v. Pickett, 598 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Ramsey,
431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977)).
70. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619. The border search exception is not based on the “exigent
circumstances” doctrine, but rather is a “historically recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s”
warrant requirement, dating back to Boyd and Carroll. Id. at 617, 621 (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623;
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).
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to subject border searches to less constitutional constraints.71 First, in
Ramsey the Supreme Court noted that the First Congress viewed customs
searches at the border as routinely accepted.72 Second, searches at the
border evoke heightened governmental interests, such as concerns of
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and Congress’s plenary power to
regulate the border.73 Given these weighty considerations, the Court has
drawn a sharp distinction between border and domestic searches:74
Travelers may so be stopped in crossing an international boundary because
of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to
identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which
may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country . . . have
a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is . . .
probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or
illegal merchandise.75

Thus, searches at the border are “reasonable simply by virtue of the fact
that they occur at the border,”76 and as a result, an individual’s expectation
of privacy is less at the border compared to the interior of the country.77

71. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616.
72. See id. at 616-17 (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623); see also Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §24, 1
Stat. 29, 43 (1789) (allowing customs officials to search, without a warrant, vessel or cargo suspected of
illegally entering the United States). Reflecting on this statute, the Court commented, “it is clear that the
members of [the First Congress] did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable,’ and
they are not embraced within the prohibition of the [Fourth Amendment].” Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 617
(quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623).
73. Torres v. Com. of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1979) (“The authority of the United
States to search the baggage of arriving international travelers is based on its inherent sovereign authority
to protect its territorial integrity.”); U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 1 (“[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises”); Id. art. I, §8, cl. 3 (“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations); Id. art. I, §8, cl. 4 (“[t]o
establish a[] uniform Rule of Naturalization”).
74. See United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973)
(“Import restrictions and searches of persons or packages at the national borders rest on different
considerations and different rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations.”).
75. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154.
76. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004) (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at
616)).
77. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1985) (“the Fourth
Amendment’s balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international border than in the
interior.”) (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 732 (11th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Hidalgo-Gato, 703 F.2d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 1983) (“On crossing a border
the individual is on notice that a search may be made[.]”) (quoting United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661,
667 (9th Cir. 1979)); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005) (“When someone
approaches a border, he should not be surprised that customs officers characteristically inspect luggage .
. . it is an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the country”)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). Scholars have noted two factors justifying this reduced
expectation of privacy: (1) travelers crossing the border are on notice that searches are likely to be made,
and (2) searches are made to the class of travelers as a whole and not to “individual[s] singled out for a
search.”; 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCHES & SEIZURES $10.5(A) (5TH ED. 2018) (citing Border Searches
and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L. J. 1007, 1012 (1968)).
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Ramsey is a principal case within Fourth Amendment border search
jurisprudence, as the Court addressed whether customs officials violated
the Constitution by opening international letter mail based only on
“reasonable cause” that the letter contained illegal contraband.78 The
majority rejected a distinction between international mail and other
personal property such as luggage, based on the “longstanding
recognition that searches at our border without probable cause and
without a warrant are nonetheless reasonable.”79
Although border searches are generally considered “reasonable” given
the context, the Court has also noted, like Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence as a whole, the “permissibility of a particular law
enforcement practice is judged” by balancing the intrusion imposed on an
individual’s privacy interests against the practice’s promotion of
“legitimate governmental interests.”80 Yet, as previously noted, this adhoc balancing test in the border context is heavily weighted in the
Government’s favor.81 Generally, routine searches at the border have
consistently been upheld without any constitutionally-required finding of
suspicion.82
However, a wrinkle in this Fourth Amendment balancing at the border
emerged with the concepts of “routine” and “nonroutine” border
searches.83 The Court in Montoya de Hernandez addressed the actions of
customs officials who detained a traveler suspected of smuggling
narcotics in her alimentary canal.84 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
78. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 611-16 (1977). Congress had granted Customs this
power via statute, and thus the Court had only to determine whether the statute violated the Constitution,
not whether “reasonable cause” was constitutionally required for the search. Id. at 615-16. The Court of
Appeals had held that the border search exception was inapplicable to the routine opening of international
mail, at this presented “too great a risk to personal privacy” without a showing of probable cause and
securing a warrant. United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415, 421 (D.C.C. 1976), rev’d, 431 U.S. 606,
(1977).
79. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619, 622 (internal quotations omitted). Searches at the border, the Court
went on to discuss, are not based on exigent circumstances, but rather stand as their own categorical
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements. Id. at 621-22. Therefore,
border searches are reasonably simply because a person or item enters into the country. Id. at 619.
80. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
81. The Government’s interest “is at its zenith at the international border.” United States v. FloresMontano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540
(1985) (“…the Fourth Amendment balance between the interests of the Government and the privacy of
the individual is … struck more favorably to the Government at the border.”).
82. See, e.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155-56 (holding that “Government’s authority to
conduct suspicionless inspections at the border includes the authority to remove, disassemble, and
reassemble a vehicle’s fuel tank.”); see United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1999) (“routine
searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, or warrant.”) (internal citations omitted); see United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d
287, 291 (5th Cir. 2018 (“routine border searches may be conducted without any suspicion.”).
83. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540.
84. Id. at 533-34.
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majority, noted that the Court had yet to decide what level of suspicion
would justify seizing a traveler “for purposes other than a routine border
search.”85 The Court then held that, given the context, detention of a
traveler at the border “beyond the scope of a routine customs search and
inspection” is justified if it is based on reasonable suspicion.86 Yet, in
Flores-Montano, the Court criticized the lower court87 for relying on the
term “routine” to “fashion[] a new balancing test, and extend it to searches
of vehicles.”88 Justice Rehnquist distinguished the use of “[c]omplex
balancing tests” to determine what constitutes a routine search of vehicles
as opposed “to a more ‘intrusive’ search of a person[.]”89 Simply put, the
“dignity and privacy interests” involved with the search of a person are
not implicated in searches of vehicles.90
III. SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES AT THE BORDER
As with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence more generally, the advent
of technological advances has required courts to determine how the
border exception squares with searches of electronic devices at the
border.91 Part A of this Section examines how federal courts have
addressed the issue, discussing the development of federal court decisions
that culminated in the recent split between the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits over whether reasonable suspicion is required to search digital
devices. Although the bulk of this section focuses on how the judiciary
has addressed this issue, Part B briefly examines the reactions of Congress
and the Executive Branch.

85. Id. at 540 (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618, n.13 (1977) (“We do not decide
whether, and under what circumstances, a border search might be deemed ‘unreasonable’ because of the
particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.”). Subsequently, in Flores-Montano the Court left
open the possibility that some property searches may be “so destructive” such that they might require a
level of suspicion required for “highly intrusive” searches of people. 541 U.S. at 152, 155-56.
86. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541. In a footnote, the majority was careful to note that
they “suggest no view on what level of suspicion, if any, is required for nonroutine border searches such
as strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches.” Id. at 541, n. 4. As LaFave notes, the constitutional
standard subsequently developed by federal courts regulating strip searches at the border requires “real
suspicion,” a standard lying between “mere suspicion” and probable cause. 5 LAFAVE, SEARCHES &
SEIZURES AT §10.5(C). Practically speaking, the standard is essentially one requiring reasonable suspicion.
87. A panel of the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed that removal of a vehicle’s gas tank at the
border required reasonable suspicion. United States v. Flores-Montano, No. 02-50306, 2003 WL
22410705, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2003) (relying on United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709 (9th
Cir. 2002)), rev’d, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
88. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (2018); United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227
(2018); see also Marion, supra note 6.
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A. The Struggle to Define “Nonroutine” Border Searches in the Context
of Electronic Devices
Searches of electronic devices at the border have increasingly drawn
attention from legal scholars.92 The Supreme Court has yet to address this
specific issue, but almost every Federal Circuit that has concluded that
suspicionless searches of electronic devices, such as laptops, cell phones,
and cameras, do not violate the Fourth Amendment.93 In light of the
routine versus nonroutine search distinction, and Flores-Montano, most
pre-Riley courts faced with these issues distinguished between searches
of a person and those of inanimate objects.94 In United States v. Arnold,
the Ninth Circuit rejected the requirement of reasonable suspicion to
search a traveler’s laptop.95 As the laptop was a piece of property, similar
to the vehicle in Flores-Montano, the search did not “implicate the same
dignity and privacy concerns as highly intrusive searches of the person.”96
Determining whether a particular search of an electronic device was
routine or nonroutine also contains another embedded issue, whether
explicitly or implicitly contained in a court’s determination: customs
officials’ method of obtaining the data.97 Information stored on electronic
devices can be accessed manually, similar to how a typical user would

92. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6 at 1943; Kugler, supra note 6 at 1165; Tom Rechtin, Back to the
Future of Your Laptop: How Backlash over Prolonged Detention of Digital Devices in Border Searches
is Sympathetic of a Need for “Reasonable Suspicion” in All Border Searches of Digital Devices, 7 THE
CRIT: CRITICAL STUD. J. 66 (2014); Samuel A. Townsend, note, Laptop Searches at the Border and United
States v. Cotterman, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1745 (2014); Sid Nadkarni, comment, “Let’s Have a Look, Shall
We?” A Model for Evaluating Suspicionless Border Searches of Portable Electronic Devices, 61 UCLA
L. REV. 146 (2013); Eunice Park, The Elephant in the Room: What is a “Nonroutine” Border Search,
Anyway? Digital Device Searches Post-Riley, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 277 (2017); Orin S. Kerr,
Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403 (2013).
93. See, e.g., Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233; United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 Fed. Appx. 506,
508 (3rd Cir. 2007) (search of camcorder did not require a warrant, consent, or reasonable suspicion);
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 505-06 (search of computer and computer disks did not require a warrant or probable
cause); United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2008); but see United States v.
Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018).
94. See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2008); but see United States v.
Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 713 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by United States v. Flores-Montano, 541
U.S. 149 (2004) (“We hold . . . that some searches of inanimate objects can be so intrusive as to be
considered nonroutine.”); see also 5 LAFAVE, SEARCHES & SEIZURES at §10.5(F).
95. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008. The lower court utilized a sliding scale of intrusiveness to reach this
conclusion. United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp.2d 999, 1002 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d, 523 F.3d 941 (9th
Cir. 2008), amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).
96. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Flores-Montano, 541 U.S.
at 152).
97. This line of reasoning stems from Flores-Montano, which some courts viewed as leaving open
the possibility of a reasonable suspicion requirement for some searches of property. See, e.g., Arnold, 533
F.3d at 1009 (“. . . there is nothing in the record to indicate that the manner in which the CBP officers
conducted the search was ‘particularly offensive[.]”). Thus, some courts began to focus on whether a
specific search was “particularly offensive.”
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access the device.98 Information can also be accessed through a forensic
examination, which, as one scholar noted, typically involves the use of
software programs to sort through the data contained on the device.99
Notably, five years after Arnold, the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Cotterman—which the court described as a “watershed case”—
distinguished between cursory, manual searches and forensic searches by
holding that a forensic examination of the defendant’s computer at the
border required reasonable suspicion.100 Although recognizing a
traveler’s reduced expectation of privacy at the border and prevalent
security concerns,101 the court differentiated electronic devices from
traditional types of property given the “private information” stored on
these devices.102 Yet more importantly, the forensic examination was the
key factor, as the “comprehensive and intrusive nature” of the search
warranted a requirement of reasonable suspicion.”103
Post-Riley, two recent Federal Appellate decisions present two
opposing views regarding forensic searches of electronic devices at the
border.104 Unlike pre-Riley cases, which focused more on the type of
98. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 140. For example, a customs official would manually unlock an iPhone
and access different applications on the cell phone, or search through a laptop by opening different files
and folders contained on the laptop.
99. Forensic searches are performed by trained analysts and reveal “a wealth of information,”
including the data stored on the device and how the device has been used. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and
Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 537-38, 542 (2005). Perhaps more significantly, a
forensic search allows analysts to unlock password-protected files, retrieve images viewed on the Internet,
and restore deleted materials. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit decided for the first time whether a warrant is required to forensically
search a cell phone at the border. United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
No. 17-8639, 2018 WL 1993728 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2018). In a notably short opinion, the court held that a
forensic search of a cell phone at the border requires neither probable cause nor a warrant. Id. at 1312. As
petitioner only challenged whether probable cause was required, the court did not address whether
reasonable suspicion was required. Id. at 1313.
100. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 956, 968 (“An exhaustive forensic search of a copied laptop hard drive
intrudes upon privacy and dignity interests to a far greater degree than a cursory search at the border.”).
The Defendant re-entered the United States from Mexico, where border agents were alerted of
Defendant’s prior conviction for use of a minor in sexual conduct, among other similar charges. Id. at 958.
The Defendant’s laptop was seized at the border, where border agents conducted an initial search as well
as a follow-up forensic examination. Id. at 958-59. A divided panel of the court previously held that no
reasonable suspicion was required for the forensic examination, which this en banc panel reversed. See
also United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 569 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that “a search of
imaged hard drives of . . . [a smartphone and flash drive] taken from the Defendant at the border and
subjected to forensic examination days or weeks later cannot be performed in the absence of reasonable
suspicion.”)
101. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 963, 966.
102. Id. at 964. Comparing the case to Montoya de Hernandez, the court believed that “[t]he private
information individuals store on digital devices—their personal ‘papers’ in the words of the
Constitution—stands in stark contrast to the generic and impersonal contents of a gas tank . . .[l]aptop
computers, iPads and the like are simultaneously offices and personal diaries.”
103. Id. at 962, 964, 968.
104. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d
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search conducted, these two decisions focused on the nature of electronic
devices more generally. In May 2018, the Fourth Circuit in Kolsuz
confronted the constitutionality of a month-long, off-site forensic analysis
of the defendant’s iPhone after federal customs agents discovered
firearms parts in defendant’s luggage.105 The majority’s analysis began
by recognizing the Supreme Court’s “general guidance” regarding the
distinction between “routine” and “non-routine,” “highly intrusive”
searches at the border.106
Upon review of applicable Circuit decisions, the majority concluded
that the distinction between routine and nonroutine searches turns
“primarily on how deeply it intrudes into a person’s privacy.”107 Applying
this principle to the forensic search of a cell phone, the court relied on
Riley’s proposition that cell phones are “fundamentally different ‘in both
a quantitative and qualitative sense’” to distinguish cell phones from other
objects traditionally subject to government searches.108 “The sheer
quantity of . . . uniquely sensitive” information on cell phones and other
electronic devices, coupled with the ubiquitous nature of these devices,
the court reasoned, makes it neither realistic nor reasonable for travelers
to leave these digital devices at home when travelling.109 As forensic
searches allow governmental agents to analyze cumulatively the intimate
details stored on electronic devices, the court held that these searches of
1227 (11th Cir. 2018).
105. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 136. The court only addressed the narrow issue of whether the forensic
search of Defendant’s phone was justified under the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 141. The forensic search, although limited to data stored on the phone itself, produced approximately
900 pages cataloguing Defendant’s phone data. Id. at 136. Previously in 2012, governmental agents
discovered 163 firearm parts in the Defendant’s luggage as he attempted to board a flight to Turkey. Id.
at 138. In this instance, agents discovered 18 handgun barrels, 22 9mm handgun magazines, four .45
caliber handgun magazines, and one .22 caliber conversion kit in the Defendant’s two checked bags. Id.
at 139.
106. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144 (citing United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)).
The court was careful to note that the Supreme Court had not “delineated precisely what makes a search
nonroutine.” Id.
107. Id. (citing United States v. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 853 (E.D. Va. 2016). See also United
States v. Uricoechea-Casallas, 946 F.2d 162, 166 (1st Cir. 1991) (applying reasonable suspicion standard
to a strip search at the border); United States v. Sanders, 663 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a
removal of artificial limb was nonroutine border search); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 709-10
(9th Cir. 1966) (holding that alimentary canal search was a nonroutine border search); United States v.
Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1349 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that an x-ray was a nonroutine border search).
108. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145-46 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014)). The court
was careful to note that “[t]he key to Riley’s reasoning is its express refusal to treat such phones as just
another form of container.” Id. at 145 (citing Riley, 573 U.S. at 391-96). See also United States v. Kim,
103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 51 (D.D.C. 2015) (highlighting the differences between digital devices and traditional
types of containers); Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *16 (D. Mass.
May 9, 2018) (“As an initial matter, the Court is not persuaded that Riley’s reasoning is irrelevant here
simply because Riley’s holding was limited to the search incident to arrest exception[.]”).
109. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145 (citing United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 556 (D. Md.
2014)).
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cell phones “must be treated as nonroutine border searches” and require
some type of individualized suspicion, although the court declined to
explicitly decide “whether reasonable suspicion is enough . . . or whether
there must be a warrant based on probable cause[.]”110 Warding off any
potential concern of unworkability in this standard, the majority noted that
CBP recently adopted a policy requiring reasonable suspicion for forensic
searches of digital devices at the border.111 However, in a concurring
opinion, one judge criticized the majority’s requirement of individualized
suspicion, citing potential separation of powers concerns and arguing that
the issue is better left to Congress and the Executive branch.112
In May 2018, the Eleventh Circuit again addressed a similar issue in
Touset.113 Border agents stopped the defendant after he arrived on an
international flight and detained the defendant’s electronic devices, later
conducting forensic searches and finding child pornography.114 In
contrast to Kolsuz, the court spent considerable time discussing the
history of the border search exception, reiterating that the Supreme Court
has never required reasonable suspicion for a search of property at the
border.115 Thus, the court refused to analogize searches of electronic
110. Id. at 145-46 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring)). In this instance, however, the court went on to uphold the search because under the
circumstances “it was reasonable for the CBP officers who conducted the forensic analysis of Kolsuz’s
phone to rely on the established and uniform body of precedent allowing warrantless border searches of
digital devices that are based on at least reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 148. Given Kolsuz’s outcome and
unique holding that only some form of individualized suspicion is required, while declining to determine
precisely what the correct level of suspicion should be (i.e. reasonable suspicion or probable cause), has
led some courts to interpret Kolsuz differently. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th
Cir. 2018) (interpreting Kolsuz as requiring at least reasonable suspicion for forensic searches of electronic
devices at the border); but see United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 2019) (stating Kolsuz
“declin[ed] to decide whether the [measure of individualized suspicion] should be reasonable suspicion
or probable cause.”).
111. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 146; see CBP Directive No. 3340-049A, supra note 9.
112. The majority, the concurring opinion argued, appears to have left the “legislative and executive
branches shivering in the cold.” Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 148 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in the judgment). Due
to the executive’s “strong sovereign interest” at the border, the majority should simply have assumed
reasonable suspicion, even if required, was present, and simply stopped any further inquiry. From this
perspective, searches at the border “should be principally a legislative question,” calling for the “greatest
caution and circumspection” by courts. Id.
113. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018).
114. Id. at 1230. As in Kolsuz, agents first manually searched the Defendant’s two iPhones and
camera, detaining only Defendant’s two laptops, two external hard drives, and two tablets. Id. Child
pornography was found on one of the laptop computers, Unites States v. Touset, No. 1:15-CR-45-MHC,
2016 WL 11432531, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2016), and the Government charged under 18 U.S.C. §2252(a)
and (b) for knowingly receiving child pornography, knowingly transporting and shipping child
pornography, and knowingly possessing a computer and computer-storage device containing child
pornography. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1231.
115. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1232-33 (“We see no reason why the Fourth Amendment would require
suspicion for a forensic search of an electronic device when it imposes no such requirement for a search
of other personal property.”); See also United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (“the
reasons that might support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches
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devices to a “highly intrusive search[] of a person’s body.”116 Reasoning
from Boyd v. United States,117 the court noted that the search of a
traveler’s property at the border is a long-standing practice deeply
associated with excluding illegal articles from the country.118 The court
found it illogical to place “special treatment” on electronic devices
because of their prevalence or storage capacities due to border agents’
“same responsibility for preventing importation of contraband in a
traveler’s possession regardless of advances in technology.”119 Searches
of electronic devices simply do not, the court reasoned, implicate the same
intrusions of privacy and violations of personal indignity as does a search
of a person’s body.120
Similarly, the majority was not persuaded with conflicting holdings
reached by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, as Riley’s narrow holding is
inapplicable to border searches.121 Citing Kolsuz’s concurring opinion,
the court called for judicial restraint given the “dangers of judicial
standard-setting in an area as sensitive as border searches[.]”122 The
majority went on to distinguish Riley’s reasoning; in searches incident to
arrest, digital devices do not implicate the concerns underlying the
exception—harm to officers or destruction of evidence.123 Yet the
concern of unlawful entry of illegal contraband that underlies Riley’s
reasoning is still implicated by digital data124 The court recognized that,

of the person – dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched – simply do not carry over to
vehicles.”); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (traveler’s “right to be
let alone neither prevents the search of his luggage nor the seizure of unprotected, but illegal, materials
when his possession of them is discovered during . . . a search.”).
116. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (citing United States v. Alfaro-Moncado, 607 F.3d 720, 729 (11th
Cir. 2010)).
117. 116 U.S. 616.
118. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363). It is also noteworthy that the Riley Court mentioned the “absen[ce] . . . [of]
precise guidance from the founding era.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014). Arguably, cases
such as Boyd established this type of precise guidance.
119. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233.
120. Id. at 1234. The Eleventh Circuit had previously identified three factors to distinguish highly
intrusive searches: (1) physical contact between the searcher and the person searched, (2) exposure of
intimate body parts, and (3) use of force. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir.
1984).
121. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (citing United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir.
2018) (concluding that Riley’s holding is expressly limited to search-incident-to-arrest exceptions and that
border searches have historically been excluded from warrant and probable cause requirements).
122. Id. at 1237 (citing United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 150 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring in the judgment)). Instead of “charging unnecessarily ahead,” the majority felt that the
“adaptable legislative process” would provide “practical insights and experience to the inquiry,”
particularly given the historical practice of “deferring to the legislative and executive branches.” Id. (citing
Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 153 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in the judgment).
123. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1235 (citing Riley, 573 U.S. at 384-87).
124. Id. at 1235.
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if anything, technological advances such as electronic devices provide
ample means for concealing contraband, and thus requiring reasonable
suspicion for these searches would “create special protection for the
property most used to store and disseminate child pornography.”125
B. Administrative and Congressional Reactions
As noted in both Kolsuz and Touset, digital device searches at the
border implicate both the Legislative and Executive branch, and this issue
has not gone unnoticed by either branch. In August 2009, CBP issued a
policy directive to provide guidance and standard operating procedures
regarding border searches of electronic devices.126 The 2009 Directive
stated that in the context of a border search, examination of electronic
devices and review or analysis of digitally stored information requires no
level of suspicion, reflecting the general consensus among federal courts
at that time.127 However, in January 2018, CBP issued a superseding
Directive governing electronic searches at the border.128 In contrast to the
2009 Directive, the 2018 Directive differentiated between a “basic
search,” which requires no suspicion, and an “advanced search,” which
requires reasonable suspicion, with the latter referring to the use of
external equipment to “review, copy, and/or analyze” digital contents.129
Concerns regarding these searches at the border have also found voice
within the Legislative branch. In April 2017, Senator Ron Wyden
introduced a bill that would prohibit all digital border searches conducted
without a warrant.130 And in February 2018, Senator Patrick Leahy
introduced a bill that would require reasonable suspicion for manual
searches and a warrant supported by probable cause for forensic
searches.131 Both bills were referred to the Senate Committee on

125. Touset, 890 F.3d at1235. The Eastern District of New York had previously expressed similar
sentiments. See Pascal Abidor, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Johnson, No. 10CV-4059 (ERK), 2016 WL 3102017, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2016) (“Applying the holding in Riley in
this context would significantly, if not totally, undermine [the purposes of a border search.]”).
126. U.S.
CUSTOMS
AND
BORDER
PROT.,
DIRECTIVE
N O.
3340-049,
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cbp_directive_3340-049.pdf.
127. Id. at 3.
128. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, supra note 9.
129. Id. at 4-5. Although the Directive suggests greater protections for the privacy of international
travelers, some attorneys have criticized the Directive for lack of guidance and argued “[t]here’s not a lot
of confidence” that the policy is actually being followed. Brandi Buchman, Committee Examines Border
Patrol’s Phone Searches, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (July 11, 2018) (quoting Neema Singh Guliani),
https://www.courthousenews.com/committee-examines-border-patrols-phone-searches/.
130. S. 823, 115th Cong. (2018). The Protecting Data at the Border Act would allow an exception
for such searches in the case of an “emergency situation.” The bill would also prohibit denial of entry into
the United States if a traveler refuses to give consent for a digital search.
131. S. 2462, 115th Cong. (2018).
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Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.132 In July 2018 the Senate
Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency
Management held a hearing regarding warrantless smartphone searches
at the border.133 As of now, no further action has been taken on either
proposed bill.
Needless to say, digital device searches at the border have become a
difficult issue for the courts, particularly in the post-Riley world. Yet as
the following section suggests, analysis of Kolsuz and Touset
demonstrates that reasonable suspicion is constitutionally required for
digital device searches at the border.
IV. DISCUSSION
The split between the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits regarding what
level of suspicion, if any, is required for forensic searches of electronic
devices at the border might at first glance appear to be a straightforward,
niche constitutional issue. However, given the intersection of two subsets
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—the longstanding border search
exception and how courts grapple with technological advances—both
Circuits’ approaches raise questions about the zeitgeist of law,
technology, and privacy.134 And, more specifically, both approaches raise
the question of how technological advances impact the sensitive area of
sovereign concerns at the border, if they do at all. The crux of the issue
concerns both how to interpret Riley and how to distinguish between
routine and nonroutine searches.
The following section suggests that Kolsuz arrived at the correct
conclusion—the Fourth Amendment requires some measure of
individualized suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices at the
border—but should have gone further by explicitly adopting the
reasonable suspicion standard. Riley plays a fundamental role in this
debate and, as such, part A of this subsection analyzes the differing
interpretations of Riley and the associated implications with each
approach. Part B dissects the split between Kolsuz and Touset, and
suggests why Kolsuz presents the constitutionally-appropriate approach
and correctly interprets Riley. Part C then explains why even in light of
Riley and Kolsuz, only reasonable suspicion should be required for
132. See S. 823, 115th Cong., https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/823; see
also S. 2462, 115th Cong., https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2462/all-info.
133. Examining Warrantless Smartphone Searches at the Border: Hearing on S. 2462 Before the
S. Subcomm. on Fed. Spending Oversight and Emergency Mgmt., 115th Cong. 1.
134. Kerr notes that when technology threatens privacy, the prevailing zeitgeist has been for the
courts and the Constitution to take an active role and offer the primary response. However, Kerr goes on
to argue that more judicial caution is required in favor of a more legislative regulation of government’s
technology use. Kerr, supra note 48 at 803, 804-05.
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forensic searches. Finally, Part D explores potential challenges lower
courts might continue to face moving forward, and suggests expanding a
reasonable suspicion requirement for manual searches of electronic
devices as well.
A. Potential Impacts of Riley on Border Searches of Electronic Devices
As the Supreme Court has yet to address search of electronic devices
at the border, a crucial question for lower courts in the post-Riley world
is what effect, if any, Riley has on the border search exception. Analyzing
Riley, there are three potential interpretations that implicate search of
electronic devices at the international border: (1) a strict interpretation,
(2) a methodological interpretation, and (3) a categorical interpretation
creating a doctrinal change.
1. A Strict Interpretation of Riley
From a strict interpretation viewpoint, Riley is limited only to the
search incident to arrest exception.135 The majority only concerned itself
with how the search incident to arrest exception applies to modern cell
phones and nothing else.136 And as Chief Justice Roberts was careful to
note, the holding was not expansive; rather, the holding was limited to
generally requiring a warrant before a cell phone is searched incident to
arrest.137 Further clarifying this holding, the majority also noted that other
case-specific exceptions or exigencies could also justify warrantless
searches of a cell phone.138
Through closer analysis, even Riley’s line of reasoning suggests a
limitation to this particular exception to the warrant requirement,139 as the
underlying justifications for searches incident to arrest were not present
with cell phones. First, searches of cell phone data categorically do not
implicate concerns of officer safety. Unlike unknown objects in a physical
container, digital data cannot immediately harm officers present during

135. See United States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp.3d 815, 818 (D. Md. 2014) (denying Defendant’s
motion to reconsider based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373
(2014)) (“Beyond exigencies, Riley makes no specific reference to the border search exception or any
other case-specific exceptions to the warrant requirement previously announced by the Court other than
to clarify that they remained intact.”) Noting the narrowness of Riley’s holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the admission of evidence seized from a defendant’s cellphone without a warrant based on the good-faith
exception. See United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 292-93 (5th Cir. 2018).
136. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 384-86 (2014).
137. Id. at 401.
138. Id. at 401-03.
139. See Miller, supra note 6 at 1987.
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the arrest.140 Second, there is no concern of preventing the destruction of
evidence. As both parties conceded, officers could have seized the cell
phone incident to arrest to prevent the destruction of any incriminating
digital evidence.141 Non-electronic evidence within the arrestee’s grasp,
on the other hand, always presents the possibility of being destroyed
before a later seizure. Thus, a strict reading of Riley, both from its holding
and reasoning, demonstrates a formal limitation only to the search
incident to arrest exception.
2. A Methodological Interpretation of Riley
Riley can also be read as presenting a slight methodological shift in
Fourth Amendment analysis in light of the digital age, particularly in
regards to individuals’ cell phones and other electronic devices.142
Although the majority was concerned with the search incident to arrest
exception, the core of the opinion builds from how to reconcile electronic
devices with the then-controlling law of searches incident to arrest. After
all, a “mechanical application” of precedent could have easily supported
the warrantless search.143 Intertwined with the discussion of how
electronic devices do not implicate the underlying rationale of the search
incident to arrest exception is a broader recognition that in the digital age,
a formal and mechanical application of precedent is often inadequate to
properly interpret the reasonableness of a given search.144 This
interpretation suggests a generally more cautious approach when
evaluating the reasonableness of a search of an electronic device.
3. A Categorical Interpretation of Riley
Within the methodological interpretation lies yet another more forceful
approach: viewing cell phones as categorically different from traditional,
tangible objects historically subject to government searches. From this
line of reasoning, Riley stands for the proposition that for Fourth
Amendment purposes, cell phones and electronic devices should be
treated as distinct from traditional physical containers. This interpretation
stems from the majority’s recognition that categorically, cell phones
implicate heightened privacy concerns due to the exposure of digital

140. Riley, 573 U.S. at 387-89.
141. Id. at 387-89.
142. See Miller, supra note 6 at 1996.
143. Riley, 573 U.S. at 385-86.
144. See Id. at 384-87. As Justice Alito was concerned, “we should not mechanically apply the rule
used in the pre-digital era to the search of a cell phone.” Id. at 406-07 (Alito, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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data.145 Even from the outset, treating a cell phone as a container “is a bit
strained as an initial matter.”146 Chief Justice Roberts recognized that cell
phones “differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense” from other
tangible objects.147
Quantitatively, the immense storage capacity of cell phones greatly
broadens the scope of an intrusion on privacy.148 In addition to the mere
technological capabilities, cell phones also allow the accumulation of
varying types of information.149 In this sense, the intrusion on privacy is
no longer physically limited as searches of non-electronic containers and
objects are. A search of a bag or purse simply does not reveal the amount
of information as would a search of a cellphone. Qualitatively, the nature
of data stored on cell phones is distinctly different from physical records.
Although electronic devices can reveal evidence of illegal activities,150
the aggregate information obtained from apps, photographs, internet
search history, text messages, and call logs, when taken together, can form
a “revealing montage of the user’s life.”151 Following this logic, both cell
phones and other similar electronic devices such as tablets and laptops tilt
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness balance towards a heightened
privacy interest of citizens.
B. Why Kolsuz Got It Right: The Shortcomings of a Traditional
Approach to Forensic Examinations of Electronic Devices at the Border
In the post-Riley world, and the digital age more generally, courts have
struggled to determine the proper constitutional protections for electronic
devices at the border. Kolsuz and Touset offer a perspective on two
differing approaches to the issue. At a baseline, these cases can both be
understood as a conflict over the correct approach of determining what

145. Id. at 393-94 (majority opinion).
146. Not to mention the ability to use cloud computing to access remotely stored digital information
not actually stored on the cell phone. Id. at 397-98.
147. Id. at 393.
148. The Court correctly noted that the “gulf between physical practicality and digital capacity”
would continue to widen. Id. at 394. At the time Riley was decided, the standard capacity of the highest
selling smart phone was 16 gigabytes. Id. Now, the standard capacity of an iPhone 8 is 64 gigabytes, with
a maximum capacity of 256 gigabytes. Apple Store, https://www.apple.com/iphone-8/specs/. The
upcoming iPhone Xs has a maximum capacity of 512 gigabytes. Apple Store,
https://www.apple.com/iphone-xs/specs/.
149. “Much of the information stored in a person's cellular phone is deeply personal. The
information can include photographs, text messages, e-mails, personal notes, records of visited websites,
and many other kinds of personal information.” Kerr, supra note 92 at 405.
150. For example, a search of a cell phone can reveal child pornography, classified government
information, communications evidencing narcotics distribution, or videos or pictures implicating an
individual in a homicide.
151. Riley, 573 U.S. at 395-96 (internal citations omitted).
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constitutes a “routine” or “nonroutine” border search, a distinction that
emerged in Montoya de Hernandez but was subsequently narrowed by the
Supreme Court in Flores-Montano. Touset represents a more traditional
application of the border search exception, simply encompassing
electronic devices into the more traditional forms of property traveling
across borders and following a strict interpretation of Riley.152 Kolsuz
holds out electronic devices as fundamentally different from tangible
objects traditionally subject to searches at the border, utilizing the second
and third interpretation of Riley.153 As the following analysis suggests, the
Fourth Circuit’s approach in Kolsuz is both the preferred and
constitutionally-appropriate conclusion.
Importing Riley’s reasoning into the border search context is logically
appropriate. Regarding an expectation of privacy, arrestees and
international travelers are in similar situations as their respective
situations leave them with reduced privacy interests.154 Upon arrest, an
arrestee is in custody of the state, and for national security purposes,
international travelers are subject to certain security searches.
Additionally, the Riley majority was particularly concerned with the
pervasiveness of cell phones. Chief Justice Roberts described the
ubiquitous nature of cell phones in an interesting manner, concluding that
cell phones are such a “pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the
proverbial visitor from Mars” might believe they are an important part of
our anatomy.155 This concern is even greater at the border, as it is both
unrealistic and unreasonable to expect an average traveler to leave their
digital device at home while traveling.156 Touset proposes that travelers
are free to simply leave these devices at home, as they are on notice that
a search may be made at the border.157 While this is true, and travelers do
have a reduced expectation of privacy,158 requiring a traveler to leave her
electronic devices at home to protect her digital information from a
potential forensic search by customs officials seems unrealistic.
Particularly given the international component of the travel, travelers use
their electronic devices for a number of necessary reasons, such as
keeping in touch with loved ones, documenting their trip, and tending to
152. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233-35 (11th Cir. 2018). Circuit precedent only
required reasonable suspicion for “highly intrusive searches of a person’s body” at the border. Id. at 1234
(citing United States v. Alfaro-Moncado, 607 F.3d 720, 729 (11th Cir. 2010)).
153. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144-46 (4th Cir. 2018).
154. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 391-92; United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539-40
(1985).
155. Riley, 573 U.S. at 385.
156. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145 (citing United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 556 (D.
Md. 2014)).
157. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1235.
158. Id.
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work obligations.
By failing to recognize any impact of Riley, the Touset majority’s
reasoning demonstrates the shortcomings of utilizing a traditional
application of the border search exception when analyzing forensic
searches of electronic devices. Touset presents a strong argument in favor
of limiting Riley’s reasoning in the border-search context. This is because,
at a certain level, Riley’s underlying rationale fails to support a
requirement of reasonable suspicion at the border. Key to Riley’s outcome
was that the reasonableness balancing test tilted in favor of individual
privacy interests; cell phones were “untethered” from the weighty
governmental interests of officer safety and preventing the destruction of
evidence.159 Requiring probable cause would therefore not infringe the
government’s legitimate interests. Thus, in the context of searches
incident to arrest, the reasonableness of searching cell phones fell in favor
of protecting individuals’ heightened privacy interest. Yet as Touset
correctly notes, the presence of electronic devices at the border does not
reduce the governmental interests. In fact, the increasing use of electronic
devices actually facilitates the transfer of contraband, particularly child
pornography, across the border.160 Requiring reasonable suspicion at the
border would therefore hinder the government’s weighty interest of
preventing the flow of contraband, much unlike the balance in Riley.
Notwithstanding the governmental interest, Touset’s reasoning fails to
recognize Riley’s other implications regarding cell phones and other
electronic devices.161 Riley can and should have a more nuanced
application in the context of border searches, as demonstrated through
Kolsuz. Considering only the strictly formal impact of Riley ignores the
broader implications regarding the Fourth Amendment and technological
advances, and effectively unhinges the Fourth Amendment from reality
and society’s ordinary expectations. The effect is demonstrated through
the personal accounts of travelers being “humiliated and shaken” by these
searches.162 Moreover, although the Eleventh Circuit had previously been
unwilling to “distinguish between different kinds of property,”163 cell
159. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 385-86.
160. “Indeed, if we were to require reasonable suspicion for searches of electronic devices, we
would create special protection for the property most often used to store and disseminate child
pornography.” Touset, 890 F.3d at 1235. See Brief of Appellee at 29, Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (No. 16-4687)
(“[T]he greater storage capacity of electronic devices enables greater harm through the smuggling of”
contraband).
161. Although Riley only addressed cell phones, the analysis is just as applicable to laptops, tablets,
and other similar electronic devices, as all of these items are still quantitatively and qualitatively different
from non-electronic tangible items.
162. See Savage and Nixon, Privacy Complaints Mount, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/us/politics/us-border-privacy-phone-searches.html.
163. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018). The majority cited FloresMontano’s rejection of a judicial attempt to distinguish between routine and nonroutine searches of a
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phones and electronic devices are not typical forms of property. Riley
logically and realistically recognized how modern cell phones are
categorically distinguishable from objects traditionally subject to
government searches.164 By mechanically applying precedent, Touset
effectively disregards the true nature of electronic devices and
demonstrates the shortcomings of utilizing a traditional application of the
border search exception.165 Continuing such a distinction will inevitably
lead to a narrowing of rights and the “detriment of individual liberty.”166
A large part of the issue arguably lies with how to determine what
constitutes a nonroutine border search. Kolsuz posits that the
determination is “focused primarily on how deeply . . . [the search]
intrudes into a person’s privacy.”167 In contrast, Touset focuses on “the
indignity that will be suffered by the person being searched.”168 Yet as
Touset also draws a firm line between searches of persons and property,
personal indignity is largely framed in terms of physical indignity.169 The
Eleventh Circuit’s mechanical application of precedent and bright-line
between property and persons prevents the recognition that searches of
tangible items, such as luggage, are fundamentally different from
searches of electronic devices.170 Although there is inevitably some form
vehicle, as well as a Ninth Circuit opinion upholding a suspicionless search of a crew member’s living
quarters on a foreign cargo ship. Id. (citing United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004),
United States v. Alfaro-Moncado, 607 F.3d 720, 727 (11th Cir. 2010)). However, the Third Circuit had
required reasonable suspicion for a border search of a passenger cabin on a cruise ship. United States v.
Whitted, 541 F.3d 480, 488 (3rd Cir. 2008). Interestingly, Riley might even offer a counter-argument
diminishing the impact of this analogy: “In 1926, Learned Hand observed . . . that it is ‘a totally different
thing to search a man’s pockets and use against him what they contain, from ransacking his house for
everything which may incriminate him.’ If his pockets contain a cell phone, however, that is no longer
true. Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most
exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously
found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any
form—unless the phone is.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396-97 (2014) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
164. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 391-94.
165. Touset relied on Circuit precedent, which drew a bright-line rule distinguishing property from
persons. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (citing Alfaro-Moncado, 607 F.3d at 732).
166. Donohue, supra note 46 at 678.
167. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144 (internal citation omitted).
168. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (citing Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1345).
169. The Eleventh Circuit considers three factors that contribute to the personal indignity endured
by the person searched: (1) physical contact between the searcher and the person searched, (2) exposure
of intimate body parts, and (3) use of force. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (citing United States v. Vega-Barvo,
729 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1984)).
170. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144-46; see also United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 51 (D.D.C.
2015) (“I cannot help but find that even if a computer or cell phone is analogized to a closed container, a
forensic search cannot be analogized to a conventional search of luggage or even of a person. A forensic
search is far more invasive than any other property search that I have come across and, although it lacks
the discomfort or embarrassment that accompanies a body-cavity search, it has the potential to be even
more revealing.”) (citing United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 568 (D. Md. 2014)).
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of indignity suffered from either search, combing over the personal effects
within a suitcase is drastically different from a government official
perusing through one’s electronic device.171 While such an inquiry would
have been appropriate before Riley, it is hard to believe that, post-Riley,
the search of an electronic device does not implicate any personal
indignity.172 Cell phones and laptops represent a digital version of their
owners—their “digital selves.” These devices “possess[] a greater
measure of personhood” than traditional, non-electronic property.173
Unlike other physical “containers,” electronic devices are more akin to an
extension of the owner, which from a metaphysical sense can explain why
a traveler having such a device searched experiences a feeling of privacy
invasion.174
Kolsuz’s focus on privacy concerns more generally recognizes that in
the digital age, personal indignity can be implicated at the border outside
of a search of a person. Cell phones and laptops allow individuals to carry
a “cache of sensitive personal information,”175 information that
“contain[s] the most intimate details” of individuals’ lives.176 Although
searching an electronic device might not rise to the level of indignity
suffered by the search of one’s person, a fairly high level of indignity is
still suffered.177 By searching cell phones or laptops, customs officials
171. A search of luggage and the physical items within can elicit feelings of embarrassment and
violations of privacy, as one’s undergarments or letters can be revealed. A search of a cell phone or laptop
also reveals functional equivalents of physical items, such as photographs or emails. However, a traveler
likely feels a higher degree of privacy in the information stored on electronic devices, which is
demonstrated by passwords placed on these devices. Moreover, electronic devices can also reveal an
individual’s activities, such as browsing history.
172. One scholar conducted an empirical study measuring the perceived intrusiveness of electronicdevice searches and the actual expectations of ordinary citizens. Summarizing the findings, the author
concluded “[e]lectronic-device searches are seen as among the most intrusive of those described in the
current case law. They are the most revealing of sensitive information. They are only less embarrassing
than strip searches and body cavity searches.” Kugler, supra note 6 at 1211.
173. Rechtin, supra note 92 at 87. Distinguishing electronic devices from the gas tank in FloresMontano to electronic devices, Rechtin argues that cell phones and laptops have a “dual life.” Digital
devices not only serve as a container of “matter,” but also have the “ability to embody and transmit the
person’s thoughts and expressions” and thus serve as “an extension and embodiment of the person who
owns it.” Id. at 87-88.
174. See Id.; see also Savage and Nixon, supra note 162.
175. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014).
176. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 145 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Cotterman,
709 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)). As one scholar noted, “[i]t’s no exaggeration to say that
unfettered access to a cellphone allows investigators to uncover details about almost every intimate
communication and relationship associated with the owner of the cell phone.” Examining Warrantless
Smartphone Searches at the Border: Hearing on S. 2462 Before the S. Subcomm. on Fed. Spending
Oversight and Emergency Mgmt., 115th Cong. 1 (testimony of Matthew Feeney, Director, Project on
Emerging Technologies at the Cato Institute).
177. It is also important to note that when electronic devices are searched, the traveler is either
detained or free to leave without their device. See Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL
2170323, at *5-8 (D. Mass. May 9, 2018). These measures only add to the indignity suffered when

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/6

26

Soder: A Constitutional Limbo

2019]

A CONSTITUTIONAL LIMBO

265

have access to sensitive text messages and emails, private photographs,
and Internet search history.178
The fact that Kolsuz and Touset addressed forensic searches simply
exacerbates the issue of privacy. Such “comprehensive forensic analysis”
of digital devices reveals an “unparalleled” amount of information.179
And unlike a manual search, forensic searches generate reports that
cumulatively analyze all of the data stored on an electronic device.180 It is
not difficult to imagine that a traveler who is forced to allow customs
officials to forensically search their phone or laptop will experience a
range of emotions such as anger, humiliation, or personal offense. Taking
Kolsuz as an example, the forensic analysis generated an 896-page report
including the Defendant’s photos, videos, emails, messenger
conversations, call log, and calendar.181 By adhering to a strict
property/person distinction, the decision in Touset allows customs
officials to gain all of this information without any individualized
suspicion that a traveler was involved in criminal activity.182
An argument can be made that requiring reasonable suspicion for
forensic searches in effect allows greater protections for electronically
stored photographs than for physical copies of photographs carried across
the border, but such an argument misses the point. With hard copies of
photos, travelers intentionally choose which images will accompany them
on their travelers. Whereas with electronic images, travelers carrying their
cell phone or laptop travel with hundreds or thousands of photos that are
contained on these devices. There is no cognition, no decision-making
involved in which photos are taken on a certain travel and which photos
are left behind. The same holds true for other digitally stored data, such
as emails and text messages.
Kolsuz’s conclusion that some form of individualized suspicion is
required for forensic searches of electronic devices demonstrates the
proper analysis of the issue in light of Riley. Despite the long-standing
border search exception, modern electronic devices implicate greater
privacy concerns for the traveler, shifting the reasonableness balance in
favor of the traveler and thus requiring reasonable suspicion to search the
traveler’s electronic devices. As Riley noted, when privacy-related
suspicionless digital device searches are conducted.
178. Id. at 145; see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 395-96. For example, two of the plaintiff’s in Alasaad
had their phone searched, which revealed photos of the plaintiffs without their headscarf. 2018 WL
2170323, at *5-7.
179. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 139.
182. Touset’s majority goes on to note that “[a]lthough it may intrude on the privacy of the owner,
a forensic search of an electronic device is a search of property. And out precedents do not require
suspicion for intrusive searches of any property at the border.” 890 F.3d at 1234 (internal citation omitted).
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concerns are weighty enough, this can overcome the diminished
expectation of privacy an individual might have.183 Given the inherently
sensitive nature of data stored on electronic devices, combined with this
information being forensically searched, the Fourth Amendment must
protect travelers from such searches conducted without reasonable
suspicion.
C. Reasonable Suspicion Should Be Required to Perform a Search of a
Traveler’s Electronic Devices
Although Kolsuz leaves open the possibility that a higher standard than
reasonable suspicion could be required for forensic searches at the border,
reasonable suspicion is the correct standard to apply.184 For although
Riley’s reasoning influences the border search exception, due weight must
still be given to the exception’s justifying principles and the longstanding
recognition of the government’s strong interests at the border.185 Given
Riley’s narrow holding, the opinion should not be understood as a
categorical rule requiring probable cause or a warrant whenever
government officials seek to search electronic devices.186 Riley should
instead be read as demonstrating a doctrinal shift: searches of electronic
devices implicate heightened privacy concerns that need to be given due
weight in the reasonableness balancing.187
Even though forensic searches of electronic devices are invasive
actions infringing traveler’s Fourth Amendment privacy interests, the
government’s interest at the border is still at its “zenith.”188 And as Touset
correctly notes, the emergence of the digital era still implicates traditional
and legitimate governmental concerns.189 As an example, consider a
traveler who possesses child pornography and is attempting to board an
international flight. In the pre-digital age, CBP or ICE officials could
183. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 391-93 (2014) (internal citation omitted).
184. But see Miller, supra note 6 at 1996 (concluding that post-Riley, digital border searches should
be treated as nonroutine and require reasonable suspicion or probable cause).
185. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels
of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977).
186. But see United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1313-19 (11th Cir. 2018) (Pryor, J.,
dissenting) (post-Riley, forensic search of phone at the international border requires a warrant based on
probable cause).
187. This interpretation explains Chief Justice Roberts’ discussion of why exigencies could allow
warrantless searches of cell phones. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401-03 (2014). Exigencies increase
the government’s interest under the specific circumstances, thus again re-shifting the reasonableness
balancing.
188. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004) (internal citation omitted).
189. “[T]he government interest in stopping contraband at the border does not depend on whether
child pornography takes the form of digital files or physical photographs.” United States v. Touset, 890
F.3d at 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2018).
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search the traveler’s suitcase, without any level of suspicion, and uncover
the child pornography. However, in the digital age, if electronic devices
receive a higher degree of protection from searches and child
pornography is stored on the traveler’s cell phone, the child pornography
will be subject to greater Fourth Amendment protections merely because
it is stored digitally. Thus, Riley cannot be fully applicable, and probable
cause or a warrant cannot/should not be constitutionally required, as there
is no lessened governmental interest in these situations. Rather, as
previously noted, due to the heightened privacy interest in electronic
devices, the determination of reasonableness must be re-balanced.
Determining that, as a constitutional matter, probable cause or a warrant
is required would ignore the governmental side of the equation,
particularly in light of the digital era. Furthermore, as both Kolsuz and
Touset acknowledge, in the border context courts have only required
reasonable suspicion for even the most intrusive nonroutine searches and
seizures.190 A requirement of reasonable suspicion therefore allows for a
proper constitutional balance between the competing interests.191
On the privacy-side of the equation, due to the sheer amount of
information stored on a cell phone or other electronic device, forensic
searches are not necessarily carefully tailored to the border search’s
justifying principles.192 Such a search might well uncover evidence of
criminal wrongdoing, but it will also inevitably generate vast amounts of
innocuous, sensitive information.193 Based on Touset, if a customs official
only held a bare-naked hunch that a certain traveler was in possession of
child pornography or involved in trafficking narcotics, the official could
forensically search that traveler’s electronic devices. This search might
reveal photos of child pornography, but it would also include details of
the traveler’s emails, messages, and Internet search history. And even
190. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 147 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Kolsuz,
185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 852-53 (E.D. Va. 2016)); Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233 (citing United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985)).
191. A pragmatic argument can be made that even if no level of suspicion is required for forensic
searches, the majority of international travelers will likely be unaffected. CBP and ICE officials only have
limited resources to conduct such searches and will therefore only act in instances where there is a real
suspicion of criminal activity. Yet given the rapid pace of technological advances, one can imagine a near
future where forensic searches can be conducted quite easily and efficiently. As noted in Cotterman, “[i]t
is little comfort to assume that the government—for now—does not have the time or resources to seize
and search the millions of devices that accompany the millions of travelers who cross our borders. It is
the potential unfettered dragnet effect that is troublesome.” United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966
(9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
192. See, Park, supra note 92 at 293.
193. It can also be argued that unlike physical contraband, digital contraband presents a more
attenuated connection to the rationales underlying the border search exception. Digital contraband can
also “cross” the border digitally, such as through the Internet. This argument was presented in Alasaad
but was rejected by the court due to insufficient evidence in the record as to the claimed Internet transfers.
No. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *19 (D. Mass. May 9, 2018).
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though Kolsuz’s requirement of reasonable suspicion would not prohibit
such a comprehensive search if reasonable suspicion exists, it would
provide the appropriate safeguard for a traveler’s Fourth Amendment
rights.194
D. A “Reasonable Balance” at the Border Requires Reasonable
Suspicion for All Searches of Electronic Devices
Even though Touset and Kolsuz only addressed the reasonableness of
forensic searches of electronic devices, both opinions implicitly shed light
on the issue of manual searches of such devices. Unlike pre-Riley cases
such as Cotterman, the majority of Touset’s and Kolsuz’s discussion and
reasoning surrounded electronic devices as a category, not merely the type
of search performed. As courts continue to struggle with the proper
treatment of searches of digital devices at the border, Kolsuz implicitly
provides insight on how manual searches could and should be addressed
in the near future.
The Kolsuz majority referred to the distinction between forensic and
manual searches as “perfectly manageable,”195 seeming to suggest a
bright-line distinction between the two methods for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. However, several scholars have noted that postRiley, such a distinction might be unwarranted.196 While it is true that
forensic searches inevitably involve a more intrusive process,197 a manual
search still implicates the same concerns expressed in Riley and Kolsuz.
Although manual searches do not generate a “precise, comprehensive
record” of the “uniquely sensitive” digital information,198 the same

194. A plausible argument can be made that forensic searches should require at least probable cause,
particularly given the nature of these searches. Government officials are not only able to access sensitive
digitally stored information, but can access deleted files and efficiently sort through vast amounts of data.
From a normative perspective, requiring probable cause is likely the desired outcome. However, searches
at the border are fundamentally different given the context. And as even strip searches at the border only
require reasonable suspicion, providing a greater constitutional protection for digitally stored information
seems inappropriate.
195. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967).
196. See, e.g., 5 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE AT §10.5(F) (analyzing cases addressing the issue);
Park, supra note 92 at 286-88 (although going on to argue that reasonable suspicion should be required);
Laura Nowell, note, Privacy at the Border: Applying the Border Search Exception to Digital Searches at
the United States Border, 71 FED. COMM. L.J. 85, 96-100 (2018) (arguing that courts should utilize the
difference between forensic and manual digital searches as a factor in the analysis).
197. In Arnold, the Ninth Circuit held that CBP officers did not need reasonable suspicion to simply
“boot . . . up” a laptop and manually search through the digital contents, as the search was not conducted
in a “particularly offensive manner.” 533 F.3d 1003, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2008) In Cotterman, the court
considered a forensic search of a laptop’s hard drive. Given that Arnold only involved a “quick look and
unintrusive search,” the court distinguished Arnold on the ground that the forensic search was a
comprehensive and “exhaustive exploratory search.” 709 F.3d 952, 960-61, 966 (9th Cir. 2013).
198. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145.
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underlying information is still revealed to government officials through a
manual search. The difference between a forensic and manual search is
simply one of degree, and on a foundational level the information Kolsuz
sought to protect from forensic searches is still implicated through manual
searches.
Post-Kolsuz, it appears that such a distinction has the potential to, and
should, be erased. For although Kolsuz addressed only forensic searches,
much of the reasoning focuses on traveler’s privacy interests in digital
devices, rather than on the method of search.199 The majority reads Riley
as an express refusal to treat cell phones as “just another form of
container,” demonstrating Riley’s categorical basis for excluding cell
phones from searches incident to arrest.200 If courts do begin to rely on
this categorization of cell phones and other electronic devices as being
fundamentally different from traditional forms of tangible property, it is
easy to see how manual searches could soon require reasonable suspicion.
Given Kolsuz’s explicit recognition of the “uniquely sensitive nature” of
digital information,201 attempting to distinguish manual searches from
forensic searches, such as a distinction between a search of a person and
an x-ray or strip search, is illogical. Digital device searches are unique not
merely because of the form of the search, but rather due to the information
stored on the devices. Therefore, even a manual inspection still invokes
the same privacy concerns associated with the more intrusive forensic
search.
E. The Proper Role of the Courts
One nuance in the on-going judicial and scholarly debate is the
question of a proper balance between the Judicial, Legislative, and
Executive branches.202 Essentially, the inquiry is whether courts should
play an active role in deciding if some level of justification is needed to
search digital devices at the border, or rather defer to the Legislative and
Executive branches. This issue is particularly heightened in the context of
electronic device searches at the border given the unique position of such
searches. Digital device searches raise not only broader questions
regarding how the Fourth Amendment applies to technological advances,
but also a narrower question of how the former question changes when
the search occurs at the border.
Touset represents a more cautious judicial approach, choosing to allow
199.
200.
201.
202.
179-80.

Id. at 145-46.
Id. at 145.
Id.
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 48; Townsend, supra note 92 at 1745; Nadkarni, supra note 92 at
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Congress to develop the appropriate standard instead of “charging
unnecessarily ahead.”203 The majority reasoned that the call for judicial
caution is heightened in the sensitive context of border searches, as
Congress is more capable of weighing the associated costs and benefits
while developing new rules.204 The concurring opinion in Kolsuz echoed
this position, arguing for a separation of powers approach and criticizing
the majority for wandering from the core role of the courts pursuant to
Article III.205 While this position has its merits, the historical premise of
the Fourth Amendment and the reasonable expectation of privacy test of
Katz suggests that courts should play an active role in regulating privacy
when technological advances are involved.206
While a concern of separation of powers is somewhat implicated with
digital device searches at the border, a judicial requirement of reasonable
suspicion in no way oversteps the bounds of the Judiciary’s constitutional
responsibilities. Reasonable suspicion serves a fundamental role to
balance the government’s interests with an individual’s privacy interest,
merely establishing a constitutional baseline that customs officials cannot
cross. This requirement simply protects travelers from unreasonable and
unwarranted searches of their electronic devices; at a minimum, only
those travelers whom customs officials have reasonable suspicion to
believe are involved in criminal activity could have their electronic
devices searched. The reasonable suspicion standard achieves the
appropriate balance, ensuring law-abiding travelers need not worry about
being subjected to an intrusive search of their electronic devices and
sensitive digital information.
Although the Fourth Amendment establishes this baseline, Congress is
still free to pass legislation requiring probable cause and/or a warrant for
digital device searches at the border. Moreover, even though CBP
recently issued a policy directive requiring reasonable suspicion for
forensic searches of electronic devices,207 this alone is inadequate. Such
policy changes are encouraging, but only through judicial action, or
legislation, can travelers be truly assured that they will not be subjected
203. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 150
(Wilkinson, J., concurring in the judgment)). This position resonates with Orin Kerr’s argument that when
technology is in flux, courts should “place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial caution . . . and consider
allowing legislatures to provide the primary rules governing law enforcement investigation involving new
technologies.” Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 48 at 805.
204. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1237.
205. “The standard of reasonableness in the particular context of a border search should be
principally a legislative question, not a judicial one.” Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 148 (Wilkinson, J., concurring
in the judgment).
206. See supra Section II-B; but see Kerr, supra note 48 (arguing that courts should take a more
cautious and conservative approach in favor of the legislative branch creating the primary investigative
rules).
207. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, supra note 9.
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to a digital device searched without some level of suspicion justifying the
privacy intrusion.
V. CONCLUSION
As of now, upholding suspicionless digital device searches at the
border continues to be the norm among federal courts. The Fourth
Amendment’s border-search exception is generally interpreted as
prohibiting a categorical distinction between electronic devices and
traditional, tangible property, a distinction that pre-Riley had a proper
precedential basis. Although post-Riley such a position can continue to be
maintained, as demonstrated by Touset, this is the improper course. Cell
phones and laptops by their very nature contain sensitive, personal
information, and consequently searches of these devices invoke
heightened privacy concerns. Kolsuz properly recognized this heightened
interest, interpreting Riley as presenting a doctrinal change when
analyzing searches of electronic devices under Fourth Amendment
standards. And although Kolsuz distinguished between forensic and
manual searches, such a distinction is likely to dissipate over time as both
searches implicate individual privacy concerns of sensitive digital data.
When balancing the traveler’s interest against that of the Government in
the international border context, reasonable suspicion provides the proper
constitutional requirement for all searches of digital devices at the
international border. Such a requirement ensures protection of individual
liberty and privacy while still allowing Congress and the Executive
branch ample room to regulate border searches, such as requiring a higher
level of suspicion.
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